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Abstract
Agricultural technology adoption is often a sequential process. Farmers may adopt
a new technology in part of their land ﬁrst and then adjust in later years based on what
they learn from the earlier partial adoption. This paper presents a dynamic adoption
model with Bayesian learning, in which forward-looking farmers learn from their own
experience and from their neighbors about the new technology. The model is compared
to that of a myopic model, in which farmers only maximize their current beneﬁts. We
apply the analysis to a sample of U.S. soybean farmers from year 2000 to 2004 to
examine their adoption pattern of a newly developed genetically modiﬁed (GM) seed
technology. We show that the myopic model predicts lower adoption rates in early
years than the dynamic model does, implying that myopic farmers underestimate the
value of early adoption. My results suggest that farmers in my sample are more likely
to be forward-looking decision makers and they tend to rely more on learning from
their own experience than learning from their neighbors.
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11 Introduction
Many researchers model agricultural technology adoption as a binary choice problem: farmers
choose to either adopt a new technology or not at all (e.g. Cameron, 1999; Barham et al.,
2004; Useche, Barham and Foltz, 2009). This assumption allows researchers to use the Logit
or multinomial Logit model to analyze the adoption process. However, in reality farmers may
behave in a sequential or “stepwise” fashion. They may choose to apply the new technology
on part of their land ﬁrst, and then adjust their adoption in later years after observing the
outcome from the partial adoption, or, if applicable, farmers may adopt selected components
of the new technology package ﬁrst and then adjust later upon learning (Leathers and
Smale, 1991). For example, during the “Green Revolution” the new agricultural technologies
included new seed varieties, optimal fertilizer usage and other cultivation requirements.
“Farmers...experiment with recommendations, often adopting them in stages rather than
as a complete package” (Cummings, 1975, p.24). A similar pattern is observed in farmers’
adoption path of the newly developed genetically modiﬁed (GM) seeds since the mid-1990s.
Farmers rarely switch all their land from conventionally bred seeds to GM seeds immediately.
Rather, the adoption process follows a gradual transition pattern and farmers end up with
full adoption, partial adoption or no adoption after about 15 years since the inception of the
new technology. 1
What factors have driven such an adoption pattern? Indeed, technology adoption is likely
a dynamic process, as it involves risk management, learning behavior as well as investment
adjustment (Griliches, 1957; Barham et al., 2004). Such a dynamic process essentially implies
that farmers are forward-looking, i.e., they take account of the possible future beneﬁts or
costs when making current adoption decisions. If the new technology entails uncertainty
1Note the diﬀerence between sequential adoption and partial adoption in equilibrium. Partial adoption
in equilibrium is due to the heterogeneity in farmers’ land, such that part of their land may not be suitable
for the new technology. Sequential adoption focuses on the process, i.e., why it takes several years to reach
the “equilibrium” level of adoption.
2and high potential risk in yield or proﬁtability, one possible future beneﬁt of farmers’
experimenting with partial adoption today could be their updated knowledge about the
new technology through learning. With the potential future beneﬁts in mind, it is possible
that farmers adopt a new technology in part of their land even when it appears less proﬁtable
than the traditional technology during the initial periods. If farmers are not forward-looking,
i.e. being “myopic”, then they will only adopt a new technology if it generates greater current
beneﬁt than that of the traditional technology. The myopic farmers will then exhibit a lower
rate of early adoption compared to the forward-looking farmers because they underestimate
the value of early adoption by ignoring the potential future beneﬁts. Or the myopic farmers
may over-adopt in the early periods if they ignore the future costs associated with the
technology, therefore overestimate the value of early adoption of the new technology. It is
possible to observe both types of farmers in the real world. For example, a family farm with
a long history may be likely a forward-looking farmer, while a farmer with a short-run land
tenure contract may be likely a myopic farmer.
Researchers have worked hard in trying to understand the technology adoption process in
agriculture. Following Griliches (1957), early adoption literature on agricultural technology
focus on how heterogeneity in farm land and the characteristics of farmers aﬀect adoption
decisions. For example, Feder, Just and Zilberman (1985) conduct a survey of the literature
on agricultural technology adoption and suggest that farm size, risk and uncertainty, human
capital, labor availability and the credit constraint contribute to diﬀerences in the adoption
process. A recent work by Useche, Barham and Foltz (2009) employs a mixed multinominal
Logit model to investigate the eﬀect of heterogeneity in both farmers and the GM corn seeds
on farmers’ adoption decisions. Their results show that farmers adopt diﬀerent types of GM
seeds according to their preferences on diﬀerent traits embedded in the seeds.
Recent literature has started to recognize the dynamic nature of the adoption process
and to incorporate the learning component into the adoption model (e.g. Besley and Case,
31994; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Baerenklau, 2005). Both Besley and Case (1994) and
Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) model the adoption of high-yielding seed varieties (HYVs)
with learning in India during the Green Revolution era. Besley and Case (1994) ﬁnd that
the cooperative learning model ﬁts their data the best while the myopic model the worst.
Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) explicitly model farmers’ learning of the optimal target input
and focus on the eﬀect of self-learning versus learning from neighbors. Both papers conﬁrm
that imperfect knowledge of the new technology inhibits adoption and farmers’ learning can
reduce uncertainty signiﬁcantly. Baerenklau (2005) builds a similar adoption model with a
focus on risk preference, learning and peer-group inﬂuences. He applies his model to a group
of Wisconsin dairy farmers and ﬁnds that risk preference and learning are the key factors in
driving technology adoption, and that peer-group inﬂuence plays a less important role than
self learning.
In this paper we construct a continuous choice dynamic model where forward-looking
farmers learn the proﬁtability and the risk of a new technology by experimenting on part of
their land. Based on their Bayesian beliefs regarding the risk of the new technology, farmers
solve a ﬁnite period dynamic programming problem to choose the amount of land to allocate
to the new technology in each time period. Unlike the previous literature that focus on the
learning of the mean proﬁt (e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Besley and Case, 1994), my
model focuses on the learning of the variance, or the risk associated with the new technology.
Moreover, in my structural model estimation, all the parameters in the dynamic model are
recovered by searching within the whole parameter space, which diﬀers from the previous
dynamic adoption literature that either rely on reduced form estimation recovering only part
of the parameters (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995) or conduct the parameter searching
within limited parameter space only (e.g. Besley and Case, 1994; Baerenklau, 2005).
My model is applied to a panel of U.S. soybean farmers from year 2000 to 2004. Two
types of seed technologies are present in the U.S. soybean seed market: the conventionally
4bred seeds and the GM herbicide tolerance seeds. For the same sample of farmers, we
estimate both a myopic model and a dynamic model and compare results from both models.
We ﬁnd that the myopic model estimation predicts lower adoption rates during early years
than the dynamic model estimation, which is consistent with the belief that myopic farmers
underestimate the value of early adoption. The predicted adoption pattern from the dynamic
model ﬁts the observed adoption path better than that from the myopic model, suggesting
that these farmers are more likely to be forward looking. My results also show that for these
farmers, self learning aﬀects adoption decisions more than the learning from their neighbors
does, which conﬁrms ﬁndings regarding the role of social learning in the existing literature
(e.g. Besley and Case, 1994; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Baerenklau, 2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, where
we specify the distribution of returns from two technologies: a conventional technology
and a new technology, and construct farmers’ Bayesian learning process accordingly. We
describe the data in Section 3. In Section 4 we explain the estimation strategies for both
the myopic model and the dynamic model. Section 5 presents the estimation results and the
interpretation. The last section concludes.
2 An Adoption Model with Bayesian Learning
Suppose farmers face with two technologies: an existing conventional technology (old) and
a newly developed technology (new). We assume that the proﬁts of both technologies are
random, i.e., both technologies are risky assets for farmers. If farmers are myopic, they
will choose the adoption rate of each technology only to maximize their current beneﬁts.
However, if farmers are forward-looking, they will choose a sequence of adoption rates to
maximize their total discounted beneﬁts across time.
52.1 A Mean Variance Framework
Suppose for each farmer the total proﬁt π is normally distributed, then the expected utility
u(π) can be expressed as a function of the mean and variance of the proﬁt (Huang and
Litzenberger, 1988, p.61) , so for farmer i
ui(π) = f(E[π],σ
2(π)),
where E[π] and σ2(π) are the expectation and the variance of total proﬁt respectively.
Assume function f(·) to be linear as
f(E[π],σ





where βi is a measure of the degree of farmer i’s risk aversion and is speciﬁed as




with Ai the farm size of farmer i, and β0, βi the corresponding parameters. Then, we can
write the expected utility of farmer i as:














The distributions of proﬁts from the old and the new technology are speciﬁed as follows.
2.1.1 Distribution of Returns
Assume both technologies being seed technology: the old one being the conventional seed
and the new one being the GM seed. The proﬁt per unit of land is assumed to be normally
distributed. For conventional seed, since it has been planted for many years, we assume the
6distribution is known to farmers:
Conventional πc ∼ N(µc,σ
2
c).
For GM seed, the proﬁt at time t for farmer i is assumed to be
πigt = µg + εigt ,
where µg is the average proﬁt of GM seed, and εigt is an independently and identically
distributed normal random variable with mean zero and variance σ2
ε. The error term εigt may
include the eﬀect of rain fall, soil conditions, unobserved individual farmer characteristics,
etc., on the average GM proﬁt across farmers and time, thus it is known to farmers but
unobservable to econometricians. Farmers, however, can only perceive the average proﬁt of
GM seed µg with uncertainty, and their beliefs follow a normal distribution µg ∼ N(µigt,σ2
igt),
which can be updated over time based on their own experience and the information they
may obtain from neighbors.
Speciﬁcally, the learning process is: at time zero, farmer i receives exogenous information
on µig0, for which farmer i believes its accuracy can be measured as σ2
ig0; At time 1, if it is
proﬁtable, farmer i may experiment with the GM seed on part of his or her land, and then
update his or her beliefs on both parameters as µig1 and σ2
ig1, based on learning from the
ﬁeld experiment. Meanwhile, farmer i observes his or her neighbors’ behavior and may also
learn from that information to update µig1 and σ2
ig1. This learning process keeps going until
it reaches the steady state.
72.1.2 Update the Variance σ2
igt of the Perceived GM Average Proﬁt µg









The proﬁt variance induced by the disturbance εigt, σ2
ε, cannot be reduced by farmers’ eﬀort
of learning. σ2
igt, however, can be reduced by learning from experiments. The term σ2
igt can be
interpreted as farmer i’s perceived variance of the GM proﬁt or the uncertainty associated
with adopting the GM seed. Since GM is a new technology, the uncertainty is high and
farmers may perceive a high variance with its proﬁtability initially. This perceived variance
may decrease over time if farmers learn about this new technology by experimenting on
part of their lands and/or by communicating with their neighbors. For example, Figure 1
illustrates a possible path of the perceived variance of GM proﬁt over time with a constant
belief on the mean: at time 0, farmers’ perceived variance of µg is high; With experiments
over time, farmers become less uncertain about µg and the perceived variance σ2
igt become
lower as time t increases.
If the learning process of each farmer follows a Bayesian setup, then farmer i updates his
















where Git is farmer i’s total adopted units of land of the GM seed at time t, G−it is the
average adopted total units of land of his or her neighbors, σ2
ξ is the additional variance in
farmer i’s learning from neighbors. This formula implies that if farmer i does not adopt any
GM seed at time t, and does not obtain any information from his or her neighbors, his or her






Figure 1: Perceived Variance of GM Proﬁt
belief toward the variance of the GM proﬁt stays the same as it was at time t−1. If farmer
i experiments the GM seed on part of his or her land at time t, the more he or she plants
the GM seeds (increase in Git), the more he or she will learn about µg (decrease in σ2
igt+1);
And if this farmer lives in a region with high adoption rates of his or her neighbors (increase
in G−it), he or she will also have a better knowledge of the GM technology (decrease in
σ2
igt+1). However, the information farmer i could get from neighbors may carry additional
noise comparing to information obtained from his or her own experience (|
∂σ2
igt+1




The noise in neighborhood information may come from two sources: 1) some information
may get lost during the communication; and 2), if the average GM proﬁt depends on farmers’
individual characteristics, as argued by Manski (1993) and Mushi (2004), the information
from the neighbors may be biased and not applicable to his or her own case.
For the variance of proﬁt from planting conventional seed, because the conventional seed
may be vulnerable to some uncertain events such as pest infestations, we assume its variance
depends on a random state variable zt which follows an AR(1) process. So for farmer i at







zt = λzt−1 + νt νt ∼ N(0,σ
2).
To be speciﬁc, we assume σ2





ict(zit) = γ0 + γ1zt = γ0 + γ1(λzt−1 + νt). (4)
Assume γ1 positive, a higher infestation rate brings a higher variance of the proﬁt from the
conventional seed, therefore a lower expected utility. It also suggests that if farmer i knows
that the value of the random state variable zt will be very low at time t, then a low enough
σ2
ict would lead to a low adoption of GM seed even he or she knows that GM seed is overall
better than conventional seed.
2.1.3 Mean Proﬁt
I assume that farmers’ beliefs on the mean of the GM proﬁt µigt to be constant, i.e., farmers
receive an unbiased estimator of the mean on perceived proﬁt of GM seed initially, and only
update their beliefs on its accuracy (the variance σ2
igt) in the later time periods. 3 Moreover,
we assume that there is heterogeneity in farm land and that a farmer can conceptually
arrange all his or her lands in such an order that the suitability of the land for planting GM
seeds is decreasing. This suitability for GM seeds may be related with soil conditions, land
quality, infestation vulnerability, or other factors of the land. Suppose farmer i owns a total
of Ai units of land plots, we assume that the diﬀerence between the unbiased belief of GM
3In reality, farmers may update their beliefs on the mean of the average GM proﬁt too. See Appendix
A for the Bayesian updating of the mean. We impose this restriction in order to facilitate my empirical
analysis later for the U.S. soybean market. Moreover, my assumption may not be overly restrictive. As some
agronomists point out (Hurley, Mitchell, and Rice, 2004), in general the GM technology does not increase
but insure the potential yield, therefore GM seed does not necessarily bring a higher revenue.




i = ¯ µ
k
i − ηc = ηig(Xi) − ηgc
k
Ai
where k = 1,2,...,Ai.
where ¯ µk
i is farmer i’ s belief of GM proﬁt, ηc is the mean proﬁt of the conventional seed, ηig
is the highest possible proﬁt diﬀerence, which is speciﬁed to be a linear function of farmer i’s
characteristics Xi as ηig = ηg +cXi. And we assume ηgc > 0, i.e., the mean proﬁt diﬀerence
between GM and conventional seed is decreasing in k.
Figure 2: Diﬀerence in Mean Proﬁts
If farmers’ adoption decisions are made on comparing mean proﬁts only, without forward
looking, the optimal adoption rate is then determined by the intercept ηig and the slope ηgc of
the mean proﬁt diﬀerence of conventional seed and GM seed. Figure 2 plots scenarios where
the optimal adoption rate αit can be zero (line C: no adoption), 1 (line A: full adoption) or
between 0 and 1 (line B: partial adoption).
Suppose farmer i adopted a total of Git plots of GM seed at time t, the total mean proﬁt

























Ai , i.e., the adoption rate of GM seeds by farmer i at time t.
2.2 Adoption Process
The problem for farmer i in time t is to choose an adoption rate αit in order to maximize
his or her total discounted expected utility. Assume independence between proﬁts from land
plots, the total mean and variance of the proﬁt for farmer i at time t is
E[πit] =
 



























ict are speciﬁed in Equation (3) and (4). The current payoﬀ at time t for
farmer i is



















































≡ uit (αit,Sit|Θ) ,
where Sit is the state variable, which includes the current belief of the GM proﬁt variance
σ2
igt, the proﬁt variance of conventional seeds σ2
ict, and the total soybean acreage Ait. Θ is
12the parameter space of the model Θ ≡ {σ2
ε,σ2
ξ,γ0,γ1,ηc,ηig,ηgc,βi}.
It is commonly observed that the technology diﬀusion follows a pattern of S-curve, i.e.,
the new technology spreads at an increasing rate during the early period, then its adoption
slows down gradually and eventually maintains at a rather constant level. This adoption
pattern also holds for the GM soybean seeds in US: after the introduction of GM soybean
seeds in the mid-1990s, it spreads across the U.S. rapidly, but after about 10 years, especially
after year 2004, its momentum is lost and the adoption rate becomes ﬂat. Motivated by this
fact, we model the dynamic adoption problem as a ﬁnite period model, i.e., farmer i chooses
a sequence of acts {αil}l=t,t+1,...,T to maximize his or her total discounted expected utility









With current payoﬀ deﬁned as in Equation (7), the Bellman Equation is
Vit(Sit) = max
αit
{uit(αit,Sit |Θ) + δ EVit+1(Sit+1|Sit)}. (9)
3 Data
In the empirical application, we apply the model developed in Section 2 to the U.S. soybean
market. The soybean market is chosen for two reasons: ﬁrst, it comprises two technologies,
the conventionally bred seed and the GM seed designed to control weed, which ﬁts the
theoretical model developed for two technologies in Section 2; second, the adoption of GM
soybean seed in the U.S. has been stabilized after year 2004, which justiﬁes the ﬁnite period
assumption in this model.
The empirical analysis is based on a large, extensive survey data collected by dmrkynetec
13(hereafter DMR). The DMR data comes from a stratiﬁed sample of US soybean farmers
surveyed annually. It provides detailed farm-level information on seed purchases, acreage,
seed types, and seed prices. We identify a panel of 432 farmers who have been surveyed from
2000 to 2004 out of a total of 11,060 farmers in the DMR data. Figure 3 shows the average
adoption rate of GM soybean seeds of these 432 farmers over the ﬁve years, and the average
adoption rate of GM soybean seeds from the whole DMR data and from USDA NASS data
during this time period 4. The sample average adoption rate follows the same pattern as
in both the DMR population and the USDA NASS population. It suggests that farmers in
my sample may not diﬀer from farmers in the population in terms of adoption behavior. To
avoid the complication caused by farmers’ switching between soybean and other crops across
years, we focus on farmers with relatively constant soybean acreage over time. 5 After the
screening, 348 farmers left in my sample. Figure 4 shows the locations of these 348 farmers.
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year
population: from DMR USDA_national_adoption
sample farmers
Figure 3: Average Adoption Rates: Sample vs. Population
4Data is collected from the website of USDA at http://www.nass.usda.gov/. Please refer to the report
on “acreage” from year 2000 to 2004.
5In practice we construct a measure which is the standard deviation of the farm size divided by its mean,
and we dropped those farmers whose farm size variation is greater than 30%.
14Figure 4: The Location of Selected Farmers
For the neighborhood adoption rate, we deﬁne the “neighborhood” at the Crop Report
District(CRD) level, and construct the CRD adoption rate using the DMR population data.
And we use the average individual soybean acreage and the average CRD soybean acreage
over years for Ai and A−i in the empirical analysis. Other farmer characteristics include the
latitude and longitude of the center of the county where the sample farms locate.
4 Estimation
In the empirical application, we estimate two models, a myopic model for farmers without
forward-looking and a dynamic model in which farmers take account of future beneﬁts or
costs when making adoption decisions. For both models, the simulated generalized method
of moment (GMM) is used to search the set of parameters that minimize a weighted distance
between the predicted adoption path and the observed adoption path.
154.1 Myopic Model
Without forward-looking, farmers only maximize their current payoﬀ in each period. Thus
for given time t, farmer i choose the optimal αit to maximize his or her payoﬀ uit, which is














































where Θ is the parameter space as deﬁned before. And the second order condition is
u
′′











Equation (10) suggests that for any set of parameters there is a one-to-one correspondence
between σ2
igt and α∗
it. Since the actual adoption rate in the ﬁrst period (year 2000) is known,
we obtain the perceived GM variance for year 2000 σ2















I then update σ2
igt for all the following years according to the Bayesian rule in Equation (3),
and compute the predicted adoption rate for each farmer in all the following years according
to Equation (10).
164.2 Dynamic model
In the dynamic model, farmers will take account of all the future beneﬁts when they are
making adoption decisions. In order to compute the predicted adoption path, we make
assumptions on the transition probabilities of state variables, value function of the last
period and the priors of Bayesian beliefs.
Assumption on transition probability
Since we focus my analysis to those farmers with relatively constant soybean acreage over
time, and the data suggest that the total soybean acreage in their neighborhood (CRDs)
remains rather stable during my study period, we can rewrite Ait as Ai and A−it as A−i.
The state variables can be transformed to Sit = {αit−1,α−it−1,zt,Ai,A−i} according to the
speciﬁcation of σ2
igt and σ2
ict. So the transition probability of the states is
P(Sit+1|Sit) = P(αit,α−it,zit+1|αit−1,α−it−1,zit) = P(zt+1|zt),
because αit is determined by farmers’ maximization behavior and the pair of {αit,α−it} is a
solution of the Markov perfect equilibrium as argued by Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) and
Besley and Case (1994). For P(zt+1|zt), we follow Tauchen (1986) to discretize the space of
zt to 9 equispaced points and compute their transition probabilities. See Appendix B for
details.
Assumption on the last period
The data suggests that toward the end of my study period (year 2004), change in adoption
rate becomes ﬂatten out (See Figure 3). Indeed most farmers stop adjusting their adoption
rate of the GM soybean seeds after three or four years since they start the ﬁeld experiment
with GM seeds. Therefore we assume that in the last period the dynamic learning process
17is already in steady state, i.e., EViT+1 = EViT for T ≥ 5. Therefore the Bellman equation
for the last period is










Based on the value of the last year, we compute the value function for all the previous years
for each farmer according to the Bellman Equation.
Assumption on the prior of Bayesian beliefs
To update the Bayesian beliefs we need the prior for the ﬁrst period for each farmer. In the
myopic case, we infer the prior belief of each farmer from their adoption rates in year 2000.
However, in the dynamic model, the relationship between the Bayesian belief and farmers’
adoption rate is no longer a one-to-one correspondence. Therefore, we use the beliefs of
year 2000 in the myopic case as starting values for the Bayesian beliefs in the dynamic
case. However, there might be a systematic error as the belief for a myopic farmer may
be diﬀerent from a forwarding-looking farmer in 2000. To account for this potential bias,
we add a parameter b to all the myopic beliefs in 2000 and use them as the priors for the
dynamic case.
Compute the predicted adoption rate
The following algorithm is used to compute the predicted adoption rate:
1. Discretize the state/control space;
18The state variables are Sit = {αit−1,α−it−1,zit,Ai,A−i}, and adoption rate αit is
the control variable. we discretize all the adoption rates αit,αit−1,α−it−1 to be 51
equal-spaced points in [0,1]. For the random state variable zt, as suggested by Tauchen
(1986), we discretize it into 9 equal-spaced points in an interval [z, ¯ z], where ¯ z = −z =
3σ2 and they are the lower bound and upper bound of z.
2. Simulate the infestation rate zt for each period;
We assume zt is at its invariant state in the ﬁrst period, and simulate 9 initial points
according to its invariant probability. Then for each initial point we simulate a sequence
for the next four years according to its transition probability.
3. Compute the Bayesian beliefs;
We compute the priors as described and update the Bayesian beliefs according to the
updating rule in Equation (3).
4. Compute the value function and the policy function, i.e., the optimal adoption rate
under each possible state, of the last period;
5. Compute the value function and the policy function for all the previous years by
backward induction according to the Bellman equation in (9);
6. Trace out the adoption path for each farmer based on the policy function.
4.3 Simulated GMM
Given the random state variable zt, simulated GMM is used to estimate the parameters. For
the myopic case, we solve the model for all the simulated states zt and take the average. For
the dynamic case, we compute the optimal adoption path for each simulated zt and then
take the average value. In both cases, we try to ﬁnd a set of parameters that minimize the
weighted distance between the predicted adoption rate and the actual adoption rate.
19Deﬁne the prediction error as e(θ) = α∗
it(θ) − αs
it, where α∗
it(θ) is the predicted adoption
rate, αs
it is actual adoption rate, and let D be all the data available, i.e., D = {αit, α−it,
Ai, A−i,Xi}. Following Hansen and Singleton (1982), we assume that at the true parameter
value θ0,
E(e|D,θ0) = 0. (12)
Then for any function of data D, T(D),
E(T(D)e(θ0)) = 0. (13)
This fact is used to construct moments to estimate the parameters by generalized method of
moments(GMM). Let k be the dimension of the parameters, and l be the dimension of the
moments, l ≥ k due to identiﬁcation requirement. Let gi(θ) ≡ Ti(D)e(θ), then the GMM
objective function is





















with ˆ gi = ˆ gi(˜ θ) obtained from a preliminary estimation of θ with W = I, where I is the
identity matrix. The asymptotic distribution of the estimates ˆ θ is
√






20where Σ = (E(gig′




Both the myopic model and the dynamic model are estimated. According to the discussion in
Section 4.3, we chose the following instruments to facilitate the GMM estimation: previous
adoption rate of farmer i and his or her neighbors’ (αit−1 and α−it−1), total soybean acreage
Ai and A−i, farm characteristics Xi, i.e., the longitude and latitude , plus the prices of GM
and conventional seed from individual farmers and their neighborhoods (average price at
CRD level). In total there are 17 moments and 15 parameters for the dynamic model and
14 parameters for the myopic model. The discount factor δ is set to be 0.96 for the dynamic
model, following the practice in the literature (e.g. Rust, 1987; Pakes, 1986; Crawford and
Shum, 2005). The starting value for the myopic model is chosen based on the result of
a non-linear reduced form estimation as in Foster and Rosenweig (1995), and we use the
estimated parameter from the myopic model as the starting value for the dynamic model.
The Nelder-Mead simplex method is used to minimize the GMM objective function for both
models. Results are shown in Table 1. Figure 5 plots the predicted average adoption paths
from the myopic model and the dynamic model as well as the observed average adoption
path.
Myopic vs. Dynamic
The mean squared error (MSE) of the dynamic model is much smaller than that of the
myopic model, implying that overall the predictions from the dynamic model ﬁt the data
better, which suggests that soybean farmers in my sample are likely to be forward looking
rather than myopic. This result suggests the myopic model underestimates the value of early
adoption and therefore predicts lower adoption rates at early years. Figure 5 shows that the
21Table 1: Estimation Results
Myopic Model Dynamic Model Initial Values
ηg 0.7911 1.1059 1
ηgc 0.421 0.5615 0.5
σ2
ε 0.3496 0.4413 1
σ2
ξ 217.5944 32.724 10
β0 1.3375 1.3961 1
β1 0.0949 0.1578 0
λ 0.1252 0.1502 0.202
σ2 0.2571 0.2021 0.236
γ0 3.6317 4.3158 5
γ1 0.7002 0.3725 1
c1 lat -2.9913 -2.9389 -2.148
c2 lat2 2.9658 3.0147 2.506
c3 lon 2.2546 2.6878 1.529
c4 lon2 -0.6557 -0.4542 -0.795
b 0.3208 0
J test 104.629 91.7459
MSE 1537.4541 91.7992
predicted adoption rate for year 2001 and 2002 from the myopic model is lower than the
observed data.
The parameter b, i.e., the diﬀerence of the Bayesian belief towards the proﬁt variance of
GM seed between the myopic model and the dynamic model, is positive. It suggests that
the initial perceived proﬁt risk of the GM seed is higher in the dynamic model. However,
since the dynamic model accounts for the future beneﬁts of early adoption, forward looking
behavior still generates higher early adoption rates which are closer to the observed data
than the myopic model predicts.
Self learning vs. Learning from neighbors
Table 1 shows that the estimated parameter σ2
ξ, the noise during learning from neighbors,
is larger than the converged proﬁt variance of the GM seed (σ2
ε), or the base line proﬁt
























Figure 5: Observed Adoption Path vs. Predicted Adoption Paths
variance of conventional seed (γ0). It suggests that during the adoption process, farmers
rely more on their self experience than the information obtained from from their neighbors’
experience. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of other related literature (e.g. Munshi,
2004; Baerenklau, 2005; Conley and Udry, 2010).
Mean Proﬁt
Overall, the estimated mean proﬁt parameters (ηg, ηgc, and the parameters for latitude and
longitude) are consistent with the theoretical model, i.e., the marginal proﬁt from adoption
GM soybean seeds is decreasing, with the exact mean proﬁts diﬀer across farms. Comparing
to the myopic model, the mean proﬁt from GM seed is higher and with a smaller decreasing
marginal proﬁt. This suggests that overall the GM soybean seed is even more proﬁtable if
accounting for the future beneﬁt.
The estimated parameters with respect to farm characteristics suggest that the mean
23proﬁt of GM soybean seed is higher if the farm is located in the south and east area, but
with a reversed second order eﬀect in both directions.
Other Results
The estimated parameter γ1 is much lower in the dynamic model, which implies that comparing
to the myopic model, the random state variable zt has a smaller eﬀect on the proﬁt variance
of the conventional seed. This might happen as a forward-looking farmer could neutralize
the risk caused by random events across time.
The estimated β1 is positive, suggesting that farmers with larger total soybean acreage
are less risk-averse and more willing to adopt the GM seed. This may be driven by the
fact that a farmer with more total soybean acreage has more farm land, which indicates his
or her wealth status, and that wealthy people are less risk-averse as commonly observed in
literature.
6 Conclusion
As Besley and Case (1993) rightly put: a key factor in modeling the technology adoption is
“the extent to which empirical estimation is consistent with an underlying theoretical model
of optimization behavior”. In this paper we construct a dynamic adoption model which
models farmers’ learning behavior during the process of adopting a new technology. Using
the data from a panel of 348 U.S. soybean farmers, we estimate both a myopic model and
a dynamic model for their adoption decision on a newly developed GM soybean seed. The
results suggest that the myopic model underestimates the value of early adoption, therefore
predicts lower adoption rates at early years. Moreover, the dynamic model ﬁts the data better
than the myopic model does, suggesting that farmers in my sample behave more likely to be
forward-looking. This ﬁnding highlights the importance of estimating an empirical adoption
24model that is consistent with the underlying decision process. It conﬁrms that the technology
adoption process in agriculture is likely to be a dynamic process (Griliches, 1957; Barham
et al., 2004).
I also ﬁnd that farmers learn both from their own experience and from the information
they obtain from their neighbors’ experience. However, the neighborhood eﬀect we ﬁnd in
this case is much smaller than the self learning eﬀect. This result, as suggested by Mushi
(2004), may be because that the GM technology in soybean is sensitive to individual farm
characteristics, therefore experience from one farmer is not applicable to others and the
true distribution of the return of GM soybean seed can only be learned by farmers’ own
experience. In reality the social learning mechanism may be much more complicated, so a
reﬁned social learning mechanism and access to more information on farmers’ communication
will certainly enrich the model.
Overall, my empirical results underline the importance of dynamics in estimating the
technology adoption. The model could also be applied to other topics where the dynamic




Suppose at time 0 a farmer has a prior of πg as N(µg0,σ2
g0). If he or she only tries GM seed
on one plot in time 0 and gets a realized proﬁt πg0, then according to Bayesian rule, the
posterior N(µg1,σ2






















If he or she planted GM seeds on G0 plots at time 0 and get an average proﬁt on each


























So the more plots this farmer tries, the more the weight of the posterior mean will goes
to ¯ πg0, which converges to the true mean θ according to the Law of Large Number as the
number of plots goes to inﬁnity.
Following Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), we deﬁne ρg1 =
1
σ2
g1 as the precision of his or
her perceive posterior mean, and similarly ρ = 1
σ2
g0, ρg0 = 1
σ2
g, then
ρg1 = ρg + G0 ρg0.
26we can see that the more plots he or she tries with GM seeds, the more weights of the
precision of his perceived posterior mean shifts to the true precision.
A.2 Learning from neighbors
Suppose a farmer may observe the proﬁts of his or her neighbors, but with an additional
noise ξ, whose variance σ2
ξ is assumed to be known for all farmers. Suppose the neighbors
grow H0 in average at time 0 and he observed an average proﬁt as ¯ πh0 from the neighbors,







































So the information from his or her neighborhood will accelerate the process for the posterior





ρg1 = ρg + G0 ρg0 + H0 ρh0.
A.3 Bayesian Updating
Notice that after time 0, the posterior N(µg1,σ2
g1) becomes prior for time 1, and farmers keep
updating their beliefs as they did in time 0. So for a typical farmer, the Bayesian updating



































27B Approximation of an AR(1) process (Tauchen 1986)
For an AR(1) process like
zt+1 = λzt + νt νt ∼ N(0,σ
2),
Tauchen (1986) suggests an algorithm to approximate it in the following way.
1. First, discretize the space of z into equal-spaced points in an interval [z, ¯ z], where
z = −¯ z are the lower bound and upper bound of z. Suppose there are N points:
z = z1 < z2 < ··· < zN = ¯ z; 6
2. Suppose the length between two points is w, then the transition probability Pij =
P(zk|zj) can be computed as
Pij =

    






, k = 1
P(zk −
w


















, k = N
3. Get the invariant probability P z of each state
Given the transition probability P, we can compute the invariant probability of each






0 is an initial probability of P z.
6Tauchen (1986) suggests that N = 9 is adequate for most purposes.
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